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Abstract
The relationship between mergers and the long run rate of innovation is an open
question in antitrust economics. I develop a framework to examine this in a dynamic
oligopoly model with endogenous investment, entry, exit and horizontal mergers. Firms
produce vertically differentiated goods and may merge with rival firms to gain market
power and potentially increase the quality of their product. I extend previous work on
dynamic mergers by allowing for products differentiated on quality with competition
in prices and an endogenous long run rate of innovation. In equilibrium, horizontal
mergers are almost entirely harmful to consumers in the short run, but the prospect
of a buyout creates a powerful incentive for firms to preemptively enter the industry
and invest to make themselves an attractive merger partner. The result is significantly
higher rate of innovation with mergers than without and significantly higher long-run
consumer welfare as well. Further results explore the circumstances under which this
result is likely to hold. In order for the long run increase in innovation to outweigh
the short run harm to consumers caused by mergers, entry costs must be low, entrants
and incumbents must both have the ability to innovate rapidly, and the degree of hor-
izontal product differentiation must be low. Alternatively, when mergers can generate
innovation directly by allowing firms to combine their products they typically benefit
consumers in both the short run and long run.
∗UCLA Anderson School of Management, contact brett.hollenbeck@gmail.com.
1 Introduction
In a concentrated industry, does allowing rival firms to merge increase or decrease invest-
ment and innovation? Antitrust authorities increasingly deal with industries characterized
by high levels of investment and where innovations cause rapid changes in firm market share
and product quality.1 For these industries, the effects of a merger on dynamic considerations
such as investment, entry and exit are potentially more important than the standard con-
siderations of market power and price increases when determining the merger’s likely effect
on consumer welfare. In industries characterized by multi-sided platforms, traditional price
effects may be absent altogether and a merger’s effect on innovation incentives is especially
important. The relationship between industry concentration and innovation is itself com-
plex and non-monotonic.2 Furthermore, few things matter more for consumer welfare than
the long run rate of innovation, and the factors that determine firm decisions to develop
and produce improvements in product quality occupy a central role in economics and mar-
keting.3 Despite this, the relationship between horizontal mergers and product innovation
remains poorly understood.
Mergers between rival firms may affect investment incentives in a number of competing
ways. Investment typically imposes a negative externality on the industry, as some portion
of the gains from a successful innovation come from stealing business from rival firms. By
merging, firms will internalize this effect and reduce their investment accordingly.4 Firms
may also buy out a smaller rival to acquire its new innovation, and so use the merger as
a substitute for investing in the new technology itself.5 On the other hand, the prospect
of being bought out may also encourage entry into the market by new firms, encouraging
development of new products and technologies. Some new start-ups in technological and
pharmaceutical industries explicitly cite a potential future acquisition as an “exit strategy”
1Katz and Shelanski (2006) and Gilbert (2006) discuss the increasing importance of innovation in merger
analysis. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines introduced a section dealing with innovation, and in the
years 2013-2015, the Department of Justice challenged mergers in part due to concerns about innovation
incentives in online platforms, online display advertising, chemicals, computer cir cuits, aircraft components
and beer. For more see the Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in the United States for
those years, jointly produced by the DOJ and FTC.
2A long literature in economics considers this topic. Notably, Aghion et al. (2005) has shown a inverted-U
shaped relationship between industry concentration and innovation.
3Hauser et al. (2006) identify innovation as “one of the most important issues in business research today.”
4This internalization effect is closely related to the notion of innovation markets developed by Gilbert
and Sunshine (1995).
5This has been cited as a particularly important issue in recent pharmaceutical mergers. A notable
example is the Merck purchase of Idenix in 2014.
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when seeking early funding. A merger may also increase the new firm’s ability to innovate via
economies of scale or complementarities between the two firms’ R&D capabilities. Because
the relationship between mergers and innovation depends in a complex way on both pre and
post-merger market structure, to determine the interplay between and relative importance
of these effects requires modeling industry dynamics such as entry and investment along
with endogenous mergers.
Empirical work on this question is limited and faces several challenges.6 Instead, this
paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of mergers on R&D investment by
modeling the dynamics of a concentrated industry with fully endogenous entry, exit, qual-
ity investment and horizontal mergers. A model combining these elements is challenging,
but it is necessary in order to consider questions regarding innovation, which is inherently
dynamic.7 Future investment, exit, and entry, along with the potential for other future
mergers, can have a dramatic effect on the welfare implications and profitability of today’s
potential merger, and despite the complexity it entails, a dynamic model containing each
of these features is necessary to consider this question. In this paper I combine each of
these elements to study under what conditions mergers will increase or decrease innovation,
and in particular under what circumstances will dynamic effects outweigh static harms that
might arise under mergers.
Despite the importance of the dynamic effects of horizontal mergers, they have rarely
been studied in settings where mergers occur endogenously.8 Endogeneity of mergers is
crucial to understand their dynamic effects because current decisions regarding entry, in-
vestment and mergers should be effected by the set of likely future mergers. That mergers
6Mergers are frequently a response to a larger shock to technology, preferences or regulations that would
cause firms or the entire industry to expand or contract in the absence of a merger Harford (2005), for in-
stance, shows that industry level merger waves are primarily driven by “economic, regulatory or technological
shocks.” In addition, mergers strongly cluster over time and industries, and both the decision to merge and
the decision to invest have strong strategic components that depend on rivals’ actions. These factors make
finding causal evidence from pre and post-merger R&D levels very difficult. Even if a plausible instrument
could be found, it is unlikely the effects of mergers induced by this instrument would be generalizable to
other settings. See Nevo and Winston (2010) for more on this point. Recent attempts have been made to
estimate structural models of merger dynamics, including Jeziorski (2014) in the radio industry, Igami and
Uetake (2015) the hard disk drive industry, Nishida and Yang (2014) in retail, and Stahl (2016) in broadcast
television.
7Gowrisankaran (1999a) discusses the challenges of solving a dynamic model with endogenous mergers
and presents a lengthy discussion of the flaws inherent in static models and models of exogenously imposed
mergers.
8Cheong and Judd (2006) and Chen (2009) present numerical results showing that the welfare conclusions
of static models can be overturned in the long run. Cheong and Judd (2006) show that even in Cournot
type industries mergers may be profitable in present value terms. Each of these consider only exogenous
mergers.
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occur in waves within industries is well documented. Only a few studies have been done
where mergers arise endogenously in a dynamic context.9 Pesendorfer (2005) derives the-
oretical predictions from a Cournot model with entry, exit and mergers and finds that the
standard Cournot result is overturned if firms expect the possibility of mergers in the future.
Gowrisankaran (1999a) presents a framework for studying mergers in a dynamic oligopoly
with capacity-constrained, homogenous goods producers.
Recently, Mermelstein et al. (2018) develop a model of investment that is merger neutral
and use it to study the relationship between capital investment and mergers in a homoge-
nous good model where investment lowers production costs. They find mergers decrease
long term consumer surplus as well as incumbent profits, but that antitrust policy can
increase aggregate value. Along with the different modeling choices described above and
the different focus on innovation, I find very different results on the relationship between
mergers and consumer welfare. Despite both involving investment, building physical capital
and investing in innovations to improve product quality are quite distinct and interact with
mergers distinctly as well.
Following this work by Mermelstein et al. (2018), I adopt a similar investment technol-
ogy, described in more detail below, but study a model with a number of features that are
better suited to the study of industries where innovation is of first order concern such as
software, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and other tech hardware, telecoms, etc. In so
doing, I develop a framework which can be used to consider a variety of questions relating to
how mergers and issues relating to innovation and product quality decisions. First, instead
of firms producing homogenous goods and competing by setting quantity, firms produce
vertically differentiated goods and compete in prices. This distinction is significant both be-
cause it is in differentiated goods settings where we are most concerned with innovation and
because in this setting entry-for-buyout can be efficient as well as beneficial to consumers,
whereas in homogenous goods settings it is typically inefficient. Second, the role of mergers
is not to reduce production costs but to improve overall product quality. Finally, I alter the
9Federico et al. (2017) and Federico et al. (2018) study this question in a simple two-stage model. They
find that mergers reduce the incentives to innovate for the merging firms, as they internalize the business
stealing externality associated with innovation. This effect outweighs the increase in innovation brought
about by higher post-merger profits due to the reduction in product market competition. The model does
not allow for post-merger entry by new firms that may ameliorate this second effect and mergers always
make consumers worse off. Similarly, Motta and Tarantino (2017) studies both quality-enhancing and cost-
reducing investment incentives in a two-stage model without entry and find that mergers harm consumers
if there are no corresponding efficiency gains.
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investment technology to allow for an endogenous and variable long run rate of innovation.
I proceed by embedding an endogenous merger stage game into an Ericson-Pakes style
dynamic oligopoly model where firms produce differentiated goods and compete in prices.
They engage in entry, exit, and invest in future product quality. In each period firms may
enter merger negotiations with one another. If the firms merge, the acquired firm no longer
exists in the industry. In some specifications, I explore allowing the merging firms to combine
their products to form a new, higher-quality product. This model represents an increase
in generality over previous attempts to model the dynamic effects of mergers, while also
extending the setting to differentiated goods and an endogenous rate of innovation.
I take advantage of two recent methodological advances necessary to approach this topic.
First, I follow Goettler and Gordon (2014) in modifying the Pakes and McGuire (1994)
framework to allow for a long run rate of innovation that is endogenous. In addition, Mer-
melstein et al. (2018) show that in the Pakes and McGuire (1994) framework, the industry-
wide investment opportunity set is reduced by mergers, which necessarily reduce the number
of firms. I adapt their investment framework that allows for rich and flexible investment
patterns that are merger neutral and allow entrants to endogenously choose the quality of
their product at the time of entry. I then solve numerically for a symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibrium in pure strategies for several types of counterfactuals. An additional contribu-
tion of this paper is a proposed modification the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and McGuire
(2001) that substantially improves stability and performance, which is used to solve and
simulate the model.
I find that even in a setting where mergers exclusively increase prices and harm con-
sumer welfare in the short term, it can commonly occur that the ultimate long term effect
of allowing these anti-competitive mergers is much higher average consumer welfare. This
is because those mergers can generate a new type of preemptive or speculative entry which
increases the total amount of competition and investment taking place. In a baseline with
no mergers allowed, the industry exists primarily in a state of duopoly with one firm pro-
ducing a high quality product and another offering an inferior product and investing little.
When mergers are allowed, they frequently arise, and there is substantially greater entry.
This includes firms who enter in states where their static profits are negative, because the
prospect of a buyout is so lucrative. These new entrants then invest in their products and
occasionally become rivals to the leading firm. This competition benefits consumers directly
5
but also spurs greater investment overall, leading to a significantly higher rate of long-term
innovation. As a result the rate of innovation is dramatically higher than in a setting without
mergers.
Next I explore what mechanisms drive this result and what industry characteristics make
it more or less likely. First, because preemptive entry is the factor generating the main result,
I explore how equilibrium outcomes vary both with and without mergers as entry costs rise
from low to high. I find that with low entry costs mergers generate sufficiently higher entry
and innovation to improve consumer surplus, but with higher entry costs this effect reverses.
Consumers are harmed by mergers in the short run and while entrants eventually replace
the acquired firms, preemptive entry for the prospect of a buyout disappears and the net
effect of mergers is harm to consumers.
Second, I vary the ability of both new entrants and incumbent firms to generate large
innovations. I first vary the maximum product quality that entrants are able to achieve and
then vary the amount by which incumbents are able to improve their product quality in a
single period. These tests show that the main result that mergers increase consumer welfare
depends first on the ability of entrants to enter with at least a moderate product quality.
If firms can only enter the industry at the very bottom of the quality ladder, the dynamics
described above will generally not occur and mergers remain mostly harmful. Similarly, if
incumbents lack the ability to generate large improvements in quality, the scope for mergers
to increase long-term innovation is limited. In the case when firms can only advance their
product quality by one unit in a period there is no innovation and mergers are only harmful.
In practice, these feature can be observed by policymakers by considering relative rates of
patent filings, product life-cycles, and the underlying technology.
Next, I explore synergistic mergers in which the two merging firms can combine some
share of their products and form a higher quality product. This case may be especially
relevant in tech settings in which dominant firms compete by offering a large number of
“verticals” in one platform. A new entrant might develop a related vertical that competes
indirectly with the dominant firm, who thus has a choice of investing to try and incorporate
those same features into its platform or to buy out the new firm directly to do so. In this
case consumers might benefit from the combination of the two products but be harmed by
the loss of a nascent competitor. In addition, this type of merger might be especially likely
to generate entrants who wish to get bought out, because the buyout value is substantially
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higher when products can be combined. I find that as merger “synergies” increase, this
indeed does occur. and the higher the synergy is between firms the more likely this type of
merger is to generate additional innovation.
Finally, I examine the role of horizontal product differentiation. This can be thought of
as analogous to “contestability,” as described by Shapiro (2010), meaning the degree to which
firms who successfully innovate can capture higher market share as a result.10 When there
is a high degree of horizontal product differentiation, a successful innovation on product
quality translates into a smaller incremental increase in sales. I show that when horizontal
product differentiation is high mergers increase long-run consumer surplus by increasing
innovation. When this is low, however, this is no longer true.
This paper also helps address the larger question of what is the relationship between
competition and innovation?11 Theoretical work on this question has a long and rich history
in industrial organization, with economists offering varying opinions for why innovation
should be higher under more monopolistic or competitive industries. In recent work, Aghion
et al. (2005), suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship with low rates of innovation in
highly competitive and monopolistic settings, and high innovation in intermediate settings.
Goettler and Gordon (2014) find a similar result. Marshall and Parra (2016) extend patent
race models to show what features of product market competition lead to positive and
negative relationships between competition and innovation. Segal and Whinston (2007)
contribute to this literature by showing in a general model that antitrust policy that protects
entrant profits leads to higher innovation. They demonstrate this result for competition
policy related to exclusive contracts and network externalities, I show a result for horizontal
mergers that is contradictory in the sense that stricter antitrust policy would slow innovation,
but via a complementary mechanism. In this case, while mergers are anti-competitive, they
increase the value of entry by allowing for potentially lucrative buyouts of small firms.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows, section 2 describes the model environ-
ment and lays out the nature of mergers and investment, section 3 describes the nature of
equilibrium and method of computation, section 4 presents benchmark results on the static
and long-term effects of mergers and section 5 explores how these results vary over a range
of different assumptions and parameter values.
10Specifically, Shapiro (2010) uses the definition “The prospect of gaining or protecting profitable sales by
providing greater value to customers.”
11Shapiro (2010) calls this “arguably the most important question in the field of industrial organization.”
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2 Model
Industry dynamics are based on the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework, in which a set
of firms invest, enter, and exit endogenously in discrete time with an infinite horizon. This
model and its properties and many applications are reviewed at length in Doraszelski and
Pakes (2008), and will be given a shorter treatment here with more emphasis on the model’s
novel elements. In the model, a set of constant marginal cost firms produce differentiated
goods and compete in prices. The goods differ with respect to their level of quality and
firms can invest in future product quality using a stochastic R&D technology that combines
features of Mermelstein et al. (2018) and Goettler and Gordon (2014). Importantly, the
total set of possible investment is not necessarily reduced by a merger and the long run
rate of innovation is endogenous. Here and throughout, innovation refers to an increase
in technological frontier or an increase in product quality beyond what has been available
before. Each period, firms are allowed to enter merger negotiations with any other firm
following a random sequence. Firms will attempt to merge if the net gain to the acquiring
firm is greater than the reservation value of the acquired firm. In some specifications that
follow, mergers are quality-increasing, in that the merger results in a new, higher quality
product.
2.1 Incumbent Firms
Product Market Competition At any given time there are n ≤ n firms active in the
market, each producing a good of quality ωi ∈ {ω1, ..., ωmax}. This “quality” can be thought
of broadly, including as a function over a bundle of characteristics. For instance, the quality
of a wireless company’s product is a function of the size and quality of its coverage network,
the quality and variety of handsets, the retail distribution network, etc. The set of firms’
qualities will be referred to as Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn}. This is public information and represents
the state of the industry.
Consumer preferences are represented by u(·), where consumer k’s utility from good i
is given by uk,i = ωi + log(y − pi) + k,i, where y is income and i,k represents consumers’
differing tastes. Each consumer purchases one unit of the product that gives them the
highest utility. They may also purchase an “outside option” whose utility is normalized to
0. Following the work of McFadden (1974), if  is drawn from an extreme value distribution
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with dispersion parameter φ−1 , this results in the logit demand system:
qi(p1, ...pn; Ω) = M
exp(φ(ωi + log(y − pi)))
1 +
∑
j exp(φ(ωj + log(y − pj))))
(1)
where qi(·) is firm i’s demand andM is the size of the market, or the measure of consumers.
In this setting, φ can be thought of as the degree of horizontal differentiation in consumer
preferences, such that an increase in φ translates into a higher market share for the highest
quality product in the market. Firms face symmetric marginal costs mc and choose prices
conditional on the set of goods in the market to maximize profits, such that:
pi(pi, p−i) = qi(p1, ..., pn; Ω)(pi −mc) (2)
2.2 Investment
Firms invest to increase product quality using a stochastic R&D technology. This technology
follows recent work by Mermelstein, Nocke, Satterthwaite and Whinston (2014) (hereafter
MNS&W.) Their key insight was to recognize that, despite the value in studying the dy-
namic effects of mergers, in the widely used Pakes and McGuire (1994) dynamic oligopoly
framework mergers directly reduce the industry-wide investment possibility set by reducing
the number of firms who can invest. In the MNS&W framework, the set of possible invest-
ments and investment costs are purely a function of a firm’s current state ωi. Thus, when
firms merge and combine products, this action does not necessarily reduce the total set of
possible investments. If the new state is ω′i = ωi + ωj , the firm’s investment problem is
unchanged from the combined pre-merger problems of both firms, except that the business
stealing externality has been internalized. This is crucial for examining the relationship be-
tween mergers and innovation, since the standard model mechanically generates a negative
relationship.
In each period, firms may invest in an attempt to increase their product quality. Let this
quality ωi takes an integer value. Firm i then draws a set of investment costs {cj}ωij=1 ∈ [c, c]
for each unit that makes up ωi. This is the cost of upgrading that unit by 1. MNS&W
refer to this technology as capital augmentation although in this context it might better be
thought of as quality augmentation. In addition, firms draw another cost, which MNS&W
refer to as a greenfield cost, from some distribution [c, cg]. This determines the cost of
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product improvement for investment levels above ωi. Thus, any firm can reach any greater
state in each period, and firms with higher quality products are more likely to get low cost
draws for some number of innovations and increase their quality. In addition to being merger
neutral, this investment technology produces two desirable features. First, for a given unit
of innovation, larger firms are more efficient in the sense that they are more likely to receive
a low cost draw because they will have more opportunities. Second, within a firm there
are decreasing returns in the sense that each additional unit of investment will come at an
increasing cost.12
Long Run Rate of Innovation
As in Pakes and McGuire (1994), the industry as a whole also faces an exogenously
improving outside good. This happens with probability δ each period, and is equivalent to
reducing all firms product qualities by 1. With a bounded profit function, this exogenously
caps the long-run rate of innovation at δ. To study the effects of mergers on long-run inno-
vation, however, we need the rate of innovation to be endogenous. But if the endogenous
long-term rate of innovation exceeds δ, the set of potential good qualities Ω becomes un-
bounded. To avoid the problems this would imply, I follow Goettler and Gordon (2014) in
setting some ωmax as the industry frontier. If in any period a firm innovates or merges to
achieve a quality level ω′i > ωmax, the result is that all firms experience a downward shock
equal to ω′i − ωmax. At the same time successful innovation generates a spillover effect on
the outside good, which increases by the amount by which the innovation increased the
quality frontier. The quality frontier can thus be thought of as the maximum amount by
which a firm can innovate before knowledge spillovers cause the outside good or a newly
entering firm to benefit from the leading firms innovation. This keeps the frontier firm at
level ωmax and preserves the relative differences between the product qualities of all active
firms. Because only these relative differences matter for profits, this does not affect firm
behavior or equilibrium outcomes.
From the perspective of consumers however, it is the absolute level of product qual-
ity that matters and not just the value relative to the outside good. An increase in the
quality frontier generates additional consumer surplus in the current period but also in all
12Both of these patterns are consistent with the empirical literature on R&D and firm scale, which Cohen
(2010) in a review article summarizes as follows: “Thus, the robust empirical patterns relating to R&D
and innovation to firm size are that R&D increases monotonically- and typically proportionately- with
firm size among R&D performers within industries, the number of innovations tends to increase less than
proportionately than firm size, and the share of R&D effort dedicated to more incremental and process
innovation tends to increase with firm size.”
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future periods. I follow Goettler and Gordon (2011) in adjusting for this when calculating
per-period consumer surplus. If a firm innovates such that ω′i > ωmax, consumer welfare
therefore increases by ω
′
i−ωmax
1−β .
Firms also face a flat, fixed operating cost FC that must be paid each period and receive a
private, random scrap value upon exit, drawn from some distribution F (·). In the beginning
of each period, after observing investment costs {c1, ..., cω}, firms choose whether to remain
in business and pay FC or exit and receive the scrap value. They then choose investment
level xi ∈ {0, ..., ωmax}.
2.3 Merger Stage
Multiplicity and Proposal Order: The bulk of previous research studying the impli-
cations of horizontal mergers has examined the results of exogenously imposed mergers.
Although studying the pattern of mergers that would arise endogenously has clear benefits,
modeling endogenous mergers poses a challenge. In many industries there may exist a set
of profitable but mutually exclusive merger arrangements. The mergers in this set represent
multiple equilibria and there is no clear equilibrium selection mechanism. One solution to
this problem is to model the merger stage as a non-cooperative game, where firms propose
buyout offers according to a defined sequence that provides a unique equilibrium in each
stage.
Gowrisankaran (1999a) follows this approach, embedding in an Ericson-Pakes model a
stage game wherein the largest firm acts first. It has the ability to propose a merger to any
other firm. If it chooses not to the second largest firm may propose, and so on. The stage
game employed here is similar although the sequence by which firms may propose mergers
is random. While this adds to the difficulty of solving the model, it should result in a richer
pattern of outcomes.
At the beginning of each period, a firm is randomly chosen and allowed to enter merger
negotiations with any other firm. In the benchmark case, the acquired firm receives a
buyout and exits the industry. In an alternative specification explored in section 5.2 firms
who merge can partially combine their product qualities to a degree determined by the
amount of “synergy,” represented by a parameter σ. In this case, in the period following the
merger, the new, combined firm will produce a product of quality ω′ = σ(ωB + ωS), where
subscripts indicate the buyer and seller. The degree of synergy might reflect the amount of
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overlap between the two firms’ products pre-merger. The realism of this assumption and
what industry settings are likely to exhibit merger synergies are discussed in section 5.2.
In the benchmark case with no synergies, mergers therefore can only harm consumers
in a static sense. This is because competition is reduced and there are no cost efficiencies
that accompany the merger. This modeling choice is intentional, since mergers with large
efficiency gains that increase static welfare are uncontroversial regardless of their effects on
innovation.
During the merger stage firms are fully forward-looking. Each firm observes all potential
merger partners at the beginning of the period and all firms observe the randomized sequence
in which merger proposals may occur. The proposing firm will either propose a merger with
the firm offering the highest return in the merger stage or pass on the option. If the firm
passes, a new firm is chosen at random and given the opportunity to offer a merger. The
process continues until all firms have had an opportunity or a merger occurs. Each firm
therefore receives at most 1 chance to propose a merger. Because firms know that if they
refuse a buyout offer they may be the next firm with the power to propose a merger, they
may have the incentive to turn down a profitable merger foreseeing another, more profitable
merger with some other firm. Similarly, they may accept or propose a less valuable merger
to prevent two other firms in the market from merging and becoming too powerful.
Merger Surplus and Buyout Cost:
To evaluate a possible acquisition, firms consider the potential surplus that would result
from a merger. The merger’s surplus is the difference between the combined firm’s presented
discounted value and the sum of the separate firms’ values. If there is a positive surplus
from the firms’ merger, it will be split between the two parties. This split results from Nash
bargaining where reservation price of the firm being acquired is its value if the negotiation
fails.13 The value to the acquiring firm is the difference in values between the combined firm
and its value if negotiations fail. Let V B(·) and V S(·) be the values of the buyer and the
seller at the beginning of the following period at market structure Ω, which are described
in greater detail in the following section, and let mij indicate whether or not a merger was
agreed to by both parties, with 1 meaning it was. The size of the buyout offer τijsolves:
13One reason previous papers have resisted considering dynamic models of mergers in industries with
more than 2 firms is that there is no fully satisfactory solution to the bargaining problem merging firms
must solve due to the fact that there is a positive externality being conferred on the non-merging firm. I
use the bilateral Nash bargaining outcome, effectively ignoring the effect of the merger on the non-merging
firm. The externality still effects outcomes however, as firms might strategically wait or turn down a merger
opportunity in cases where they would benefit more from their two rivals merging.
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max
τij
(
V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− τij − V B(Ω′|mij = 0)
)ρb(
τij − V S(Ω′|mij = 0)
)ρs
(3)
where ρb and ρs represent buyer and seller bargaining power parameters. The result is a
payment equal to
τij = ρbV
S(Ω′|mij = 0) + ρs[V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− V B(Ω′|mij = 0)] (4)
Because ρs = 1− ρb by definition, this can equivalently be written as
τij = V
S(Ω′|mij = 0) + ρs[V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− V B(Ω′|mij = 0)− V S(Ω′|mij = 0)] (5)
The first term is the reservation value of the seller and the second term is the share of the
surplus from the buyer that is paid out.
2.4 Potential Entrants
In each period, a single firm may enter the market. The potential entrant lives for a sin-
gle period and must pay an entry cost to join the industry, becoming an incumbent and
competing in the product market in the following period. Potential entrants face the same
investment cost function as incumbents, but where greenfield costs begin at ωmax, allowing
entrants to innovate up to any possible ω level if they were to receive a favorable cost draw.
The timing of the model is such that potential entrants make their entry and investment
decision at the beginning of the period, simultaneous with incumbent firms making their
exit and investment decisions.
2.5 Timing
1. Incumbent firms observe investment costs and potential entrants observe entry costs.
2. Incumbents choose whether or not to exit, their investment level if continuing, and
entrants decide to enter or not and at what quality level. Their product qualities
adjust as a result.
3. Firms enter the merger stage:
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(a) All firms observe a randomly chosen sequence that governs the order in which
they may propose mergers.
(b) Firm i selects its most profitable potential partner, and if both firms find the
merger profitable relative to the option value of allowing the next firm to propose,
the two firms agree to merge.
(c) If no merger is agreed to in step (b), the merger stage repeats until either all
firms have had a chance to propose mergers or an agreement occurs.
4. If a merger agreement was reached and the antitrust authority is active, it evaluates
the proposed merger and approves or rejects. If the merger is approved, firm i pays
τij to firm j.
5. Firms compete and earn profits pi(Ω′)
3 Equilibrium and Computation
3.1 Firm Policies
In this section I formally describe firm policies over entry, exit, investment and mergers. I
describe the conditions for a symmetric, Markov perfect equilibrium and the computational
algorithm for finding it.
Incumbent exit and investment policies: At the beginning of a period, each incum-
bent draws a set of investment costs equal in number to their product quality ω, which takes
an integer value. For simplicity, I will describe the policies of one representative firm. Firm
i with product quality ωi takes ωi draws uniformly from the distribution [c, c]. In addition
they draw a greenfield cost from the distribution [c, cg].
Let V (ωi, ω−i) represent the interim value of being in state ωi while your rivals have
states ω−i after entry, exit, and investment have taken place but before the merger stage.
After observing its set of cost draws c˜i, firm i chooses its exit policy χEX ∈ {0, 1} and, if
not exiting, the amount of investment to undertake xi ∈ {0, ..., ωmax}. Simultaneously, the
industry-wide depreciation shock η ∈ {0, 1} is realized, taking value 1 with probability δ.
After investing at level xi, a firm’s state updates to ω′i = ωi + xi − η. The firm therefore
solves:
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max
xi
{−FC − C(c˜i, xi) + β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
V (ωi + xi − η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)} (6)
Where h(·|·) represents beliefs over rival firms investment outcomes, including potential
entry and exit. Let x∗i represent the solution to this problem. The firm draws a random
private scrap value φ and exits and χEX = 1 if
{−C(c˜i, x∗i ) + β
∑
η
∑
ω−i V (ωi + x
∗
i − η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)} < FC + φ.
The investment level x∗i is determined by equating the marginal cost of an additional unit
of investment to the increase in the expected value upon reaching the merger stage.
The potential entrant’s problem is very similar to that of an incumbent. It draws ωmax
investment cost draws from the distribution [c, c]. It then decides whether or not to enter
based on the expected value of pursuing the optimal level of investment. Consequently, the
product quality of the entrant is endogenous and can take any value in {1, ..., ωmax}.
Mergers: When deciding whether or not to propose a merger with another firm, firm i
must evaluate a set of potential future outcomes. Denote as V (ωi, ω−i) the value of being in
state ωi with rivals in states ω−i at the beginning of a period, before cost shocks have been
observed. To take expectations over the future state if firm i does not propose a merger,
they must consider the probability that there is a merger between other firms, which occurs
with probability
∑
k
∑
j Q(mjk|Ω) where mjk represents a merger between firms k and j.
This probability represents the joint probability that firms k or j are next to propose a
merger.
If firm i is the proposing firm, they choose:
max
{
max
j
{χAA(Ω, i, j)
[
− τij(ωi, ω−i)− cM + pi(ωi, ω−i|mij) + βV (ωi, ω−i|mij)
]
},
∑
k
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)χAA(Ω, j, k)
[
pi(ωi, ω
′
−i|mjk) + βV (ωi, ω′−i|mjk)
]
(7)
The first term inside the max operator is the firm’s choice of merger partner. For each
potential partner they evaluate the size of the buyout payment and post-merger profits and
continuation value. The second term is the expected value of not proposing a merger and
potentially seeing rival firms merge in the same period.
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3.2 Equilibrium
I will consider symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies (MPE) for this model.
If s ∈ S represents some element of the state space, a MPE consists of:
• A subset R ⊂ S;
• Strategies χ∗ for every s ∈ R, where χ∗ = (χE , χEX ,mij , τij , xi, xei) respectively
governing entry, exit, mergers, buyout offers, and investment.
• Expected discounted values conditional on these strategies, V E(Ω, cei), V (ωi, ω−i),
VM (Ω, i, j)∀j, and V I(ωi, ω−i).
Such that:
1. The Markov process defined by any initial condition s0 and the strategies χ∗ has R
as a recurrent class.
2. For every s ∈ R, strategies are optimal given V E(·), V (·), VM (·), and V I(·). That is,
χ∗(Ω) solves:
max
χE
V E(Ω, cei), max
χEX ,xi
V I(ωi, ω−i), max
χM ,mij ,τij
VM (Ω, i, j)
3. Values are consistent on R. For every Ω and Ω′ that are components of s ∈ R:
V (ωi, ω−i) = pi(ωi, ω−i)− FC +
∑
i
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)V I(ω′i, ω′−i|mij)
V I(ωi, ω−i) = max{0,max
xi
−C(ωi, xi) + β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
V (ωi + xi − η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)}
V E(χE∗, xei|Ω, cei) = max{0,maxxei−C(ωmax, xei)+β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
V (xei−η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)}
Computation:
To compute the model, I map the measure of product quality ω onto the integers
{0, ..., 10}. There is no limit on the number of firms allowed in the market although under
the parameters chosen there are never more than 4 firms active in equilibrium. Most prior
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work in this literature caps the number of active firms at 2 for computational reasons. This
limitation is potentially costly, as it necessarily restricts attention to mergers to monopoly,
which are rarely allowed in practice and which always reduce consumer welfare in this model,
unlike mergers from 3 to 2 firms. A binding cap could be thought of as imposing an infinite
entry cost at states with 2 firms in the industry, even if a third firm could profitably operate.
The model is too complex to allow an analytic solution, instead, it is solved computa-
tionally using a modified version of the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001).
The potential computational burden of the model described is enormous. The size of the
state space grows exponentially in the number of firms and potential good qualities, and
for each state, the integral over potential future states required to calculate the expected
discounted value of different actions involves probability distributions over the random se-
quence of merger proposers, synergy values, exit and entry behavior, and the outcomes of
investment. The computational burden of this high-dimensional integral and state space is
the reason there has been little work done on this type of analysis to date. The stochastic
algorithm method substantially reduces this burden.
A detailed description of how the model is solved can be found in Appendix A. This
method solves the model asynchronously using the technique of reinforcement learning.
The model is simulated for a very high number of periods, with firms’ value functions
being updated with the observed results of their actions. Over time, the average of a firm’s
experiences becomes equal to its true expected value. The method offers several advantages.
The first is that equilibrium policy and value functions are only computed over a subset of
the state space. This subset, R ⊂ S, is the recurrent class of the Markov process formed by
equilibrium strategies. While the state space grows exponentially in the number of potential
firms, its possible for R to grow linearly or even not grow at all.
The other advantage is that by simulating the model rather than solving it directly, it
is not necessary to solve any high-dimensional integrals except once, in the limit. To briefly
describe the algorithm; for each visit to a state, firms solve the optimal policy based on their
estimate of the value function. Once they choose, pseudo-random numbers are drawn for any
stochastic component and the state is updated. The value function estimate at the original
state is then updated to include the profit realized and value at the new state. The process
then repeats at the new state. To improve performance, policy functions are randomly
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perturbed in a small share of periods that slowly declines to zero.14 Periodically, a test of
the equilibrium conditions is conducted, this test is described in detail in Fershtman and
Pakes (2012). The algorithm performs well, converging to the same equilibrium outcome
from very different initializations of value of policy functions.
Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness An MPE for this model can be shown to exist
following Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010). For a discussion of potential multiplicity, see
Doraszelski and Pakes (2008). Generally, there is no way to fully rule out the possibility of
multiple equilibria or to find all possible equilibria, which poses a challenge for counterfactual
policy analysis. Given that multiple equilibria have been found to exist in similar models
without a merger stage, a more complex model also plausibly suffers from this problem.
Borkovsky et al. (2012) show multiplicity in a quality ladder model, although they conclude
that “the differences between equilibria tend to be small and may matter little in practice.”
While there is no way to completely rule out meaningfully different equilibria, I proceed
by exploring the parameter space along many different dimensions and following a contin-
uation method as suggested by Judd (1998). In this procedure, I vary a parameter of the
model and trace out how equilibrium outcomes change as the parameter value changes. In
each case I initialize the model at the equilibrium value function found at the last parameter
value. I then repeat the process in the opposite direction and trace out the set of equilibrium
outcomes that results. If there are meaningfully different equilibria possible this procedure
could hopefully find them and characterize them.15. I perform this procedure using 5 dif-
ferent model parameters which are discussed in the following section. In each case, the set
of equilibrium outcomes that is traced out is presented visually for a set of benchmark re-
sults. In none of these experiments did the model result in significantly different equilibrium
outcomes as the parameter value was increased from those that resulted in the opposite di-
rection. This provides some evidence that there do not exist other meaningfully different
possible equilibria.
14This prevents the algorithm from getting “stuck” in non-equilibrium values. It is referred to in the
machine learning literature as an epsilon-greedy or epsilon-decreasing strategy. More detail on how this is
implemented can be seen in Appendix A.
15A similar procedure is followed by Borkovsky et al. (2017) and Borkovsky (2017).
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4 Results on Innovation and Mergers
The model is solved for MPE numerically with parameter values initially taken from Pakes
and McGuire (1994) with the addition of merger fixed costs set at .5 and merging firms
having equal bargaining power.16 The full set of parameters can be seen in Table 4.1. These
parameters form a benchmark case. In this section I first present results for this benchmark
case followed by extensive exploration of the parameter space with particular focus on entry
costs and the merger technology. In all cases results are computed from simulations of the
industry for 500,000 periods from the equilibrium’s recurrent class of states.
Table 1: Base Parameterization
β .925
ω 10
FC .6
cM .5
ρb, ρs .5
δ .6
c .1
c 5
cg 15
φ 1
y 15
M 10
4.1 Results in the Benchmark Case
Static Competition: Before presenting results of the full dynamic model, I explore the
static competition between firms. Figure 1 presents results on prices, profits and incremen-
tal profit gains in duopoly markets. The results show the prices at each state for a focal firm
facing 3 different possible competitors, a high-quality competitor, a low-quality competitor,
and a medium-quality competitor. Prices and profits are the result of Nash-Bertrand com-
petition and are increasing smoothly in own-quality. Facing a higher quality competitor
causes a firm to charge lower prices even when they are in the lowest possible quality state.
The incremental profit gain is the increase in profits associated with a 1 unit increase
in product quality holding rival’s quality fixed. This gain is not monotonic but is inverse-U
16The empirical finance literature finds inconclusive results on the shares of a merger’s surplus going to
either party, but most work finds the shares roughly equal. See, for instance, Ahern (2012).
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shaped, with the highest gain in profits coming from an incremental gain that puts the focal
firm at a higher quality level than a close rival. When facing a low-quality rival, for instance,
the highest profit gain comes from increasing quality from 2 to 3 or 3 to 4, after which there
are diminishing returns. When the rival has state 5, the highest gain in profits comes from
increasing from 5 to 6 followed by 6 to 7. This same feature carries over to the firm’s value
function, where the largest incremental gain in firm value comes from separating themselves
from a close rival. This provides the largest incentives to invest and to complete a merger,
in order to escape a close rivalry.
Merger Outcomes: Next I explore some features of the equilibrium distribution of
mergers. In this benchmark case there are no merger synergies. Mergers therefore only
serve to eliminate a rival firm and do not contribute to the acquiring firm’s product quality
or directly contribute to innovation. In this case, greater than 90% of mergers include a
firm operating at the leading edge of the quality ladder and the dominant firm always acts
as the acquirer. In roughly 95% of cases, mergers reduce the number of active firms from 3
to 2 and in the other 5% they reduce the number of firms from 2 to 1.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of acquired firms by product quality. This distribution
is bi-modal, with a peak at medium-low quality and a peak just below the leading firm
quality. Industry leading firms therefore use mergers both to eliminate both close rivals
and potential rivals who have reached a certain quality cutoff. It is notable that there are
very few acquisitions of truly nascent competitors who have only entered the industry at
the lowest quality level. That is, dominant firms do not reflexively buy out new entrants
but only acquire firms that have reached some minimum quality level. From the entrant’s
perspective, this provides additional incentive to invest and achieve the quality required to
potentially be acquired.
An important fact about mergers is that they are entirely harmful to consumers in the
short run. Because firms compete in prices and because there is horizontal differentiation
between products, in all cases where firms merge and synergies are set to 0 mergers reduce
consumer welfare. Consumers are harmed by the removal from the market of a product,
by the reduction in price competition that causes prices to increase on remaining products,
and by the lack of any offsetting cost efficiencies.17 In the next section results are shown
17As noted by Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) and others, the way taste heterogeneity is represented in
logit style models means that reducing the number of products available reduces total consumer surplus,
even holding all else equal.
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Figure 1:
Note: This figure shows the prices, profits, and incremental profits at each state in a duopoly as a function
of competitor state. Incremental profits represents the increase in profits associated with increasing
product quality by 1, holding rival’s quality fixed.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Acquired Firms
Note: This figure shows the distribution of firms acquired in mergers by product quality.
with positive synergies but even in these cases the vast majority of mergers harm consumer
welfare. This is not surprising, the model essentially stacks the deck against mergers that
benefit consumers in the short run in order to highlight the difference between the static
outcome and the long-term outcome.
Table 2: Buyout Cost
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 2.8
6 5.4
7 15.0
8 12.0 4.7 3.3 7.1 7.2 5.5
9 5.0 5.7 9.8 6.5 11.9 13.1 18.2 24.8
This table shows the average buyout amount arising in
equilibrium with buyer state shown in rows and seller
state shown in columns. No mergers occur in equilib-
rium with a buyer in state 4 or lower.
Industry Outcomes: Table 4.1 summarizes the key equilibrium outcomes with the
benchmark parameterization in two different settings: one in which no mergers are allowed
and one with no restrictions on mergers. In the benchmark case without firm acquisitions
shown in column 1, the industry forms a relatively stable duopoly with 1.9 firms active
in a period on average. When firms exit they are quickly replaced by a new entrant and
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entry and exit take place in roughly 10% of periods. In most periods the duopoly takes the
form of a leader and a laggard on quality where the leading firm invests enough to typically
maintain its position. The rate of innovation is measured as the average amount by which
investment advances the industry past ωmax after subtracting industry-wide depreciation,
effectively defining innovation as the rate at which the industry’s technological frontier
advances. In the no-merger duopoly outcome, innovation occurs primarily when the laggard
firm invests sufficiently to challenge the leading firm and the leading firm responds by
investing significantly to regain ground on their rival.
When mergers are allowed with no restrictions, they occur frequently, in roughly 16%
of periods. The most important result is that when mergers are allowed the rate of entry
increases substantially from only 11% of periods to roughly 27% of periods. One of the
results of this entry is that despite having mergers directly reduce competition, the result
is only slightly fewer firms in the market, on average. This decreases from 1.91 to 1.75 and
while the share of periods spent in monopoly grows substantially, mergers also increase the
share of periods with 3 firms active. The result is an industry spending roughly 9% of the
time with three firms and 34% of periods as a monopoly.
Figure 3 shows the industry dynamics following a merger. I simulate the model a large
number of times and track the outcomes that follow a merger. The figures show the average
over these simulations. We see that entering the period in which a merger occurs, the
number of active firms is close to 3. This falls to nearly 1 following the merger and recovers
to the long-term average after 6-8 periods. Similarly, the merger dramatically lowers average
consumer surplus, cutting it in half from over 12 to roughly 6. This also recovers to the
long-term average in 6-8 periods. The bottom figure shows the average states of up to 4
firms. The leading firm is always at the technological frontier. The merger reduces the
average quality of the 2nd best firm, typically by eliminating it from the market altogether.
The main result of the benchmark comparison is that, despite the fact that mergers sub-
stantially reduce welfare in the short run, allowing mergers increases the average consumer
surplus in the industry and the rate of innovation substantially. The rate of innovation in-
creases from .35 to .82. In other words, the technological frontier advances by an average of
1 unit in 80% of periods as opposed to one third of periods. Consumers benefit in perpetuity
from an increase in the technological frontier and so the increase in the endogenous rate of
innovation dramatically increases long-term consumer welfare.
23
Figure 3: Industry Dynamics Following a Merger
Note: This figure shows how the industry reacts after a merger. In period 0 a merger occurs and the figures
show the number of active firms, total consumer surplus, and the average individual firm states following
the mergers. In each case the figure depicts the average outcome over a large number of simulations.
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Table 3: Comparison of equilibrium with and without mergers
No Mergers Mergers
Firm Characteristics
Mean number of firms 1.91 1.75
Mean firm quality 5.74 6.90
Share of periods with exit 10.7% 15.0%
Share of periods with entry 10.7% 27.2%
Share of periods with mergers 12.2%
Investment
Total investment 1.45 2.27
Rate of innovation .35 .82
Mean entrant investment 3.30 4.69
Mean investment by market leader 1.18 1.45
Surplus
Mean consumer surplus 7.75 10.02
Mean total profit 13.09 12.90
Firm Distribution
Share of periods in Monopoly 14% 34%
Share of periods in Duopoly 81% 56%
Share of periods with 3 firms 5% 9%
Share of periods with 4 firms 5e-4% 4e-3%
This table presents the results of a simulation of the indus-
try for 500,000 periods from the equilibrium’s recurrent class
of states. This is a sufficient number of simulation periods that
the results displayed do not vary over simulations and so no
standard deviations are presented alongside them. In the sim-
ulation, the outcomes shown are measured in each period and
the average is taken over periods. Total investment indicates
the average sum total of investment undertaken by all firms in
a period.
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Figure 4: Entry Rates
Note: This figure shows the average rate of entry as a function of number of incumbent firms for the
equilibria with and without mergers. This is computed as the average across all market states that appear
in equilibrium across many simulations.
Preemptive Entry
Figure 4 shows that the rates of entry occurring for different numbers of incumbent
firms. When there is only one incumbent in the market, entry occurs 86% of the time in
the mergers equilibria. Entry occurs more rarely in the no-mergers equilibrium, regardless
of number of incumbent firms.
It is clear from Figure 4 that the additional entry generated in the mergers equilibrium
is not merely replacement entry after a merger reduces the number of firms below the stable
duopoly number. This is because with mergers allowed, the average number of firms in
the market actually increases, and entry rates are higher even when 2 or 3 incumbents are
present, as shown in Figure 4. Entry rates are higher at every market state. While antitrust
economists have long known that entry can mitigate the anticompetitive effects of mergers,
and entry is discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for this reason, the argument
for entry here is distinct. The value created by entry is not about reducing market power
of large, post-merger incumbents, but instead the prospect of a future buyout is generating
new, additional entry that is increasing competition and innovation while also increasing
consumer surplus.
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5 Exploration of Assumptions on Entry, Mergers and In-
vestment
In this section I explore the parameter space to see how results depend on entry costs, the
innovation ability of entrants and incumbents, the potential for merger synergies, and the
degree of horizontal product differentiation.
5.1 Entry Cost Distribution:
Entry costs are a central parameter of this model and a key feature of antitrust analysis.
Policymakers typically take a lenient approach to mergers that would otherwise present
consumers with static harm if entry is likely to occur rapidly following the merger. Figure 3
shows that in the benchmark case entry does occur relatively rapidly, reducing the harm to
consumers of the acquisition and removal of a firm from the market. But the long-term effect
of mergers in this case is not merely short-term harm alleviated by rapid entry. Instead, the
prospect of a lucrative buyout provides a powerful incentive to enter and invest, generating
greater competition and innovation and a higher steady state level of consumer welfare.
Because this is the central dynamic in the model, I first explore how this result depends on
the level of entry costs.
I vary average entry costs from low to high and trace out the average equilibrium out-
comes. In each case entry costs are still stochastic, drawn from a uniform distribution
around the average cost cE ± 2. Results are compiled for both the cases with and without
mergers and are summarized in Figure 5. At the high end of entry costs, in the setting
without mergers the industry forms a stable duopoly with no entry or innovation. At the
low end entry occurs in roughly 50% of periods and innovation and consumer welfare are
high. Similarly, in the setting with mergers as entry costs increase the rate of entry falls
substantially, as does the rate of innovation and consumer welfare.
Comparing the two scenarios as entry costs rise illustrates the mechanism by which
mergers generate higher long-term consumer welfare. We see that when entry costs are low,
consumer welfare is higher with mergers allowed than with no mergers. This is driven by
the higher rate of entry and high innovation rate overcoming the fact that there are fewer
firms on average as a result of mergers. The difference in innovation and thus consumer
surplus is substantial.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Outcomes as Entry Costs Vary
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as average entry costs vary from low to high.
As entry costs increase, the non-merger equilibrium forms a stable duopoly with neither
entry nor exit and no innovation. The mergers equilibrium also forms a stable outcome
as entry costs rise, but with a modest amount of entry by firms replacing those that have
been acquired by larger firms. This is merely replacement entry and very little innovation
occurs in this outcome. As result, consumers are harmed in the static sense by the merger
with no offsetting increase in entry and innovation, and so total consumer surplus is lower
than if mergers were not allowed. Thus for mergers to have beneficial long-term properties,
entry costs must be sufficiently low to allow for speculative or preemptive entry and the
subsequent competition and innovation that results.
5.2 Merger Synergies:
Next I consider the prospect of synergistic mergers. In the benchmark case mergers do not
generate any synergies or efficiencies. In the quality ladder model then, the combined firm
simply takes the product quality of the larger firm and the acquired firm ceases to exist. This
benefits the larger firm through lessened competition, but in practice the acquiring firm may
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take components of the acquired firm’s product and incorporate it into a combined product
with higher quality. In this case the new product would have quality ω′ = ωB +σωS) where
S indicates seller, B indicates buyer, and σ is a parameter between 0 and 1 reflecting the
degree of synergy.
Discussion:
Having firms combine their products rather than continuing to produce both and simply
adjusting prices is not how mergers are typically treated in the literature on competition
in Bertrand settings. This combination of product qualities can be thought of as repre-
senting the total utility consumers receive from a firm’s offerings, which reflect a bundle of
characteristics, and where σ represents the degree of overlap in these characteristics.
For example, a company in an online setting may offer a mobile app product that has
a number of map-based features including driving directions, links to online shopping, in-
formation on public transit options, information on specific business locations including
consumer reviews, pictures, and links, as well as varying degrees of integration with other
devices. If a new firm enters that offers one of these specific features that a large dominant
firm currently lacks, they may acquire the new entrant and integrate the new feature into
their existing product, increasing it’s quality while also eliminating a rival in the online
maps market.
A similar mechanism applies in some pharmaceutical mergers, a setting which has at-
tracted much interest with regards to the effects of these mergers on long term innovation.
For instance, when Merck bought Idenix in 2014 they stated that they planned to “combine
the drug with two of its own drugs that work by different mechanisms for a triple-drug reg-
imen that could potentially cure most types of hepatitus C in less than two months (Loftus
(2014)). Another setting to which this model applies is in online services where firms collect
data on consumers and sell this data to other interested parties. Acquiring a rival both
reduces the number of competitors and increases the quality of the acquiring firm’s product.
A recent merger of this sort is the Nielsen acquisition of Arbitron, in which the impact on
innovation incentives played an important role in the FTC’s decision.
An added benefit of this approach to modeling mergers is that it fits better within the
quality ladder setting, where firms and products are defined by their position in vertical
quality space. This is a more natural setting to study innovation and particularly the
relationship between competition and innovation, and has been used by Greenstein and
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Ramey (1998), Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), Goettler and Gordon (2014), Acemoglu and
Cao (2015), and Borkovsky et al. (2017), among others, for this purpose. Empirical work
on mergers and industry dynamics is more likely to take the form of a quality ladder as
well. In this case vertical considerations are more important than static horizontal ones like
the diversion ratio between firms and the pricing externality.18 While the product synergy
approach used here sacrifices realism with respect to static horizontal features, it does so to
focus more on what is relevant to the study of long-term innovation.
Results:
I explore the role merger synergies has on equilibrium outcomes by varying σ in small
increments from 0 to 1 and re-solving for a new equilibrium at each point. The main
results are presented in Figure 6. As synergies increase, the rate of innovation increases
dramatically, and thus consumer surplus increases as well. This is possible because mergers
can generate additional innovation beyond that generated by firm investment. If two high
quality firms merge the new product may have a quality above the current technological
frontier. Thus the merger advances the frontier and generates innovation directly.
As merger synergies increase, it becomes increasingly common for a new entrant to enter
and immediately be bought out. This generates synergies and the merger surplus is split
between the incumbent and new entrant. Notably, as the degree of potential synergies
increases, this effect eventually flattens and as synergies approach 1 the rate of innovation
levels off. This implies that the process faces diminishing returns in σ and it is not necessary
for σ to be 1 for consumers to benefit from synergistic mergers. Even modest synergies can
provide significant long-term benefits to consumers through the increased innovation they
spur.
5.3 Entrant Product Quality:
Next I explore the assumption that entrants can enter at any point in the quality ladder. In
the benchmark specification there is no cap on the product quality of a new entrant, only
increasing entry costs prevent firms from joining the industry at an already high level. In
some settings, particularly those with complex technologies or network effects, this may be
unrealistic. I therefore compute equilibrium outcomes for different specifications in which
18An alternative approach would be to retain multiproduct firms using the method of Gowrisankaran
(1999b), although this would inevitably face an insurmountable computational limitation as firms continue
to merge over time adding more and more products to their portfolios.
30
Figure 6: Equilibrium Outcomes with Merger Synergies
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as merger synergies vary from 0 to 1. For each
value of σ a new equilibrium is computed and simulated from.
this assumption is tightened.
Let ωE represent the maximum quality attainable by an entrant. Above ωE entry costs
can be thought of as infinite. Figure 7 shows equilibrium outcomes as ωE increases from 1
up to ω, the highest possible quality. When there is no limit on entrant quality, we observe
the familiar outcome that the mergers equilibrium displays significantly higher innovation
and consumer surplus than the no merger equilibrium.
As the maximum possible entrant quality decreases, the gap in consumer surplus between
the two models decreases as well. At the point where an entrant can only enter at the lowest
possible quality, the non mergers equilibrium results in higher consumer welfare than the
mergers equilibrium. In this case, there is still more innovation with mergers but the level
is quite low and there is relatively little entry. The main result that mergers increase
innovation and thus welfare therefore depends on both relatively low entry costs and the
ability of entrants to develop products with at least middling quality. When new entrants
can only enter the bottom of the quality ladder, the static harm to consumers caused by
the mergers cannot be outweighed by greater innovation.
5.4 Incumbent Innovation Capacity
In the baseline model, firms are able to innovate to achieve any level of ω in any period.
Indeed, in rare circumstances when a firm receives a set of very low investment costs,
we do observe large changes in ω in a single period. This investment technology follows
Mermelstein et al. (2018) and is important because it is “merger neutral” in the sense that
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Outcomes as Potential Entrant Quality Varies
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as average entry costs vary from low to high.
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it avoids mergers that mechanically reduce the industry’s technological possibility set and
hence investment. While important, it may not be realistic for all industries. In some
industries, it is impossible regardless of investment costs to dramatically increase the quality
of a product quickly.
I examine the results after varying the amount of product innovation firms are capable
of from the baseline of no limit down to a limit of one incremental unit per period. Let I˜
represent this cap, such that ω′ − ω ≤ I˜, or equivalently ci =∞ for ω′ > ωi + I˜.
Results are presented in Table 4. We see that when firms can only advance by 1 in
each period, the previous results are reversed. There is essentially no innovation and long
run consumer welfare is lower with horizontal mergers than without. For middle levels
of innovation capacity, mergers produce slightly higher levels of innovation and welfare.
Finally, when there is no cap on innovation, the previous result is seen again, mergers create
the incentive for much higher innovation and long run consumer welfare.
Table 4: Innovation Capacity and Mergers
I˜ = 1 I˜ = 3 I˜ = 5 I˜ = 7 No Cap
NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M
Rate of Innovation 0 0 0 .05 .07 .11 .19 .35 .35 .81
Consumer Surplus 5.8 4.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.7 7.1 9.1 7.8 10.0
Each column shows the rates of innovation and long run average consumer surplus with mergers
and with no mergers.
5.5 Horizontal Product Differentiation
In this section, I examine the role of horizontal product differentiation. This can thought
of as an analogy to “contestability” in the sense of Shapiro (2010), meaning the degree to
which firms who successfully innovate can capture higher market share as a result.19 To do
so I manipulate the scale of the individual level utility shock. This is represented by the
parameter φ in the consumers utility function, the dispersion of the random component of
utility. When this parameter is high, preferences exhibit less heterogeneity, consumers agree
more on which product offers the highest utility and firms with higher ω capture a higher
market share. When φ is low, preferences are more horizontally differentiated.
19This is distinct from how the term contestable is used by Baumol et al. (1982) who used it to referred
to a market with frictionless reversible entry.
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When horizontal product differentiation is high, a successful innovation translates into
a large increase in both market share and profits. When it is low, by contrast, there is
less reward to innovation because a larger share of utility comes from random or horizontal
components. In industries with a high degree of horizontal product differentiation, the
benchmark rate of innovation will naturally be higher because the vertical component of
utility and thus a product’s quality are valued more highly by consumers. But the relative
effects of mergers is potentially ambiguous. To resolve this, I compare equilibria with and
without mergers in industries with varying levels of horizontal product differentiation. The
results are shown in Table 5.
As horizontal product differentiation rises the effects of mergers change dramatically.
When φ = .8, there is slightly higher innovation and consumer welfare in the no-mergers
equilibrium . When horizontal product differentiation increases to φ = 1.33, the rate
of innovation and average consumer welfare are both substantially higher in the mergers
equilibrium then the no-mergers equilibrium. This result is somewhat counterintuitive,
because when horizontal product differentiation is lower, a higher share of the gains from
innovation come from business stealing. Merging firms should internalize this incentive and
invest less. Indeed, they do, investment by leading firms falls, relative to the no-mergers
case. But this effect is outweighed by a large increase in entry and innovation by new
entrants. The reason is that when horizontal product differentiation is high, monopoly is
relatively more valuable. The result is that the equilibrium buyout offer τ at the modal
merger state is 2.4 times higher when φ = 1.33 than when τ = .8.
Table 5: Horizontal Product Differentiation and Innovation
φ = 1.33 φ = 1 φ = .87 φ = .8
NM M NM M NM M NM M
Rate of Innovation .51 .89 .35 .80 .33 .12 .12 0
Consumer Surplus 9.82 12.13 7.75 10.16 7.50 7.09 6.99 6.04
Each column shows the rates of innovation and long run average consumer surplus with
mergers and with no mergers.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
The relationship between horizontal mergers and innovation is increasingly important but
poorly understood. Firm decisions to invest in improving product quality interact in many
ways with the ability to merge and acquire other firms. To examine these interactions
requires simultaneously modeling endogenous entry, investment behavior, and endogenous
mergers. In addition, firms must have a broad ability to innovate, the long-run rate of
innovation must be made endogenous, and the mergers technology must allow for a flexible
and rich pattern of mergers.
This paper develops a framework for studying these issues and a method for improving
computation of models of industry dynamics. The paper then shows that in a model with
these features, traditional horizontal mergers policy based on static welfare analysis may
be counterproductive in the long run. Even when mergers are practically designed to fail
a static consumer welfare test, the long term result when they are allowed is substantially
higher innovation and consumer welfare. The prospect of a windfall gain from a buyout
offer by the leading firm generates additional entry that otherwise would not occur. This is
possible even with a single dominant firm in an industry and does not require competition
among dominant firms to buyout nascent competitors. Furthermore, this is distinct from
the replacement entry post-merger discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Combined, these results give guidance to antitrust policymakers regarding when there
is a potential long run benefit of allowing mergers that are harmful to consumers in the
short run. First, it is necessary that entry costs or barriers to entry be low. This is a
distinct argument than the standard view of barriers to entry, however. Entry does not
merely alleviate the harm to consumers caused by the merger, with an entrant lured into
the industry post-merger by the prospect of less competition and higher profits. Instead,
entrants invest and preemptively enter the industry partially due to the incentive provided
by the prospect of a lucrative buyout This entry then results in higher competition and
more innovation.
Second, this dynamic is most likely to occur in industries where innovation is occasionally
rapid and disruptive. If entrants can only enter with a very low quality product or if
incumbents cannot make large advances in product quality in a short time period, the
additional innovation incentives generated by mergers will no be able to outweigh the short-
term harm to consumers they cause.
35
While the nature of innovation in an industry is a feature of underlying technology and
thus out of the scope of policy, it may be observable and therefore a useful factor for a
merger authority to consider. Similarly, the degree of horizontal product differentiation in
an industry is an important determinant of the innovation incentives generated by mergers.
To the extent that horizontal product differentiation is analogous to a broader notion of
contestability, policymakers may have tools at their disposal to promote this. A more
contestable market can be achieved by restricting the use of long-term contracts, bundling
requirements, and other practices that raise switching costs. In innovative industries this
policy may be more effective in promoting consumer welfare and innovation than strict
merger review.
While this paper’s main result effectively argues for leniency in horizontal merger review,
these result suggests greater attention should be paid by antitrust authorities to actions
taken by firms that raise entry barriers or decrease contestability.
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A Appendix A: Algorithm for solving the model
This appendix describes the algorithm used to solve for an equilibrium to the model de-
scribed in section 3. This builds on the work of Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Fershtman
and Pakes (2012) but adds a novel element from the reinforcement learning literature to
improve convergence properties. It has been noted that the basic stochastic algorithm of-
ten performs badly on convergence. Indeed, without the changes described below the basic
algorithm almost always fails to reach an equilibrium. Here I review some of the reasons
for this and how they can be fixed. For greater detail on the basic algorithm see Pakes and
McGuire (1994) and Fershtman and Pakes (2012).20
The algorithm proceeds iteratively, simulating the dynamic game using a stored value
function that firms use to generate policies regarding entry, exit, investment, and mergers.
At each step of this simulation, the value function is updated with the payoffs realized
for each action taken or not taken. The key components that are stored in memory are
the current state of the industry at each iteration k, called Ωk, the stored value functions
20For another application, see also Asker et al. (2016).
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defining payoffs for each action at that state: W Ik (Ωk, xi), W
E
k (Ωk, xei), and W
M
k (Ωk, i, j),
and a counter that stores the number of prior visits to state Ωk to that point: hIk(Ωk, xi),
hEk (Ωk, xei), and h
M
k (Ωk, i, j). If h
I
k(Ωk, xi) = 0, W
I
k (Ωk, xi) is empty. When the state
(Ω, xi) is reached for the first time, W Ik (Ω, xi) is set to an initial value and updated from
there.
Profits pi(Ω) are computed oﬄine for all states. Each value function is initialized at some
level that I discuss in more detail below. The timing is as follows, at each iteration k:
1. At state Ωk draw from memory:W Ik (Ωk, xi), W
E
k (Ωk, xei), W
M
k (Ωk, i, j), h
I
k(Ωk, xi),
hEk (Ωk, xei), and h
M
k (Ωk, i, j).
2. For all incumbent firms i and for the potential entrant, draw investment costs c˜i
3. Incumbents solve:
max
xi
{−C(c˜i, xi) +W Ik (Ωk, xi)} (8)
and exits if the max of this term is less than zero.
Entrants solve:
max
xei
{−C(c˜i, xei) +WEk (Ωk, xei)}
and enter if the max of this term is greater than zero.
4. Randomly draw the industry-wide depreciation shock η.
5. Using η and the investment, entry and exit decisions of incumbents and the potential
entrant, update the market state from Ωk to Ω′k.
6. Begin the merger stage by drawing a random ordering of firms to act as merger pro-
posers.
7. Loop over all firms, for each solve for the best merger partner as maxjWMk ((Ω
′
k, i, j).
If the value of merging for both firms is higher than the option value of letting the
next firm in the merger order proceed, they agree to merge, τij is calculated, Ω′k is
updated to Ωk+1, and the merger stage ends. During this stage, Ωk+1 is necessarily
rounded to the nearest integer value. Once a merger has occurred or all firms have
had a chance to propose, the stage ends.
8. Profits for all firms are calculated as pi(Ωk+1).
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9. Stored value functions are updated as:
W Ik+1(Ωk, x
∗
i ) = α
I(Ωk)β[pi(ω
′
i)− FC + EW Ik (Ωk+1)] + (1− αI(Ωk))W Ik (Ωk, x∗i ) (9)
WEk+1(Ωk, xe
∗
i ) = α
E(Ωk)β[pi(ω
′
i)− FC + EW Ik (Ωk+1)] + (1− αE(Ωk))WEk (Ωk, xe∗i ))
(10)
If firm i is acquired by firm j:
WMk+1(Ω
′
k, i, j) = α
M (Ω′k, i, j)τij + (1− αM (Ω′k, i, j))WMk (Ω′k, i, j) (11)
If firm i acquires firm j:
WMk+1(Ω
′
k, i, j) = α
M (Ω′k, i, j)[EW Ik (Ωk+1)−τij ]+(1−αM (Ω′k, i, j))WMk (Ω′k, i, j) (12)
where αI(·), αE(·), and αM (·) are weighting functions to be described in detail below.
In addition, counters hIk·), hEk (·), and hMk (·) are incremented by 1.
10. Return to step 1 at state Ωk+1.
The algorithm is periodically paused to test for whether an equilibrium has been reached.
This test follows Fershtman and Pakes (2012) and checks whether the value functions are
consistent with equilibrium notions described in section 3.2. This simulates a sample path
of the model and keeps a separate memory of the distribution of outcomes reached at each
state on this sample path. The mean squared difference between these outcomes and the
value function stored in memory is used to calculate bias. This is done separately forW Ik (·),
WEk (·), and WMk (·) and the highest bias value of the three is compared to .001 to determine
if an equilibrium has been reached.
A key consideration in the algorithm is what function to use to weight realized payoffs in
iteration k and how much to weight the current estimate ofWk(·). One alternative would be
to simply use αI(·) = 1
hIk(Ωk)
, ie the number of previous visits to that state. This ultimately
would give value functions equal to the arithmetic mean of realized payoffs across all visits
to that state. One problem with this approach is that if the initialized value functions are
far from their true values, it could take a very long time for the algorithm to converge.
A second and more serious problem with the algorithm as described above is that for
discrete choices such as entry and exit, it can get “stuck” at a suboptimal choice. For exam-
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ple, if the value functions for firm investment are set high in order to encourage exploration,
firms will initially invest large amounts and rarely exit. At the same time as they make
these choices, potential entrants are exploring entry strategies and updating their entry
value function with the realized outcomes. In the case where incumbents invest highly entry
is rarely profitable and so in certain states potential entrants may update all entry options
as having negative value. Once they have done so, entry will cease at those states and as
incumbent firms investment policies converge towards equilibrium the potential entrant will
have stopped testing entry even though it may be profitable to do so.
I solve this second problem by implementing a strategy from the reinforcement learning
literature known as -greedy exploration. In this case, firms will take what they perceive
as being the optimal action with probability 1−  and with probability  they will choose a
policy at random from their set of possible actions. The researcher sets the initial value of
 to encourage exploration and as the algorithm proceeds it declines slowly to 0. In states
in which firms take suboptimal policies as a result of this process, they learn and update
values for those policies but the other firms in the market do not update at those states.
This approach is simple but has the advantages that it ensures each action will be taken
a large number of times and that policies ultimately converge to the optimal ones. In
practice, without implementing this strategy the algorithm almost always converged to an
outcome where a suboptimal discrete choice was taken and which was strongly rejected as
an equilibrium outcome by the testing procedure. This would remain true regardless of how
long it ran. Even if this extreme case of non-convergence were not possible, it is highly likely
the -greedy exploration improves the speed to convergence of even a simple model.
A.1 Computational details
Here I provide specific details on the implementation of the algorithm. For incumbent and
entrant value functions, I initialize the values above the level of discounted profits if the
state they entered were permanent. A high initialization is useful for ensuring firms explore
their strategy space early on. That is:
W I0 (Ω) =
1.1pi(Ω)
1− β . (13)
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Merger value functions are set at a flat constant value of 5, which is high enough to encourage
exploration. For all policies,  is set initially at .1 and declines such that ′ = .9 every
200, 000 iterations.
The weighting functions used are:
αI(Ωk) =
1
min(hIk(Ωk, xi), h¯
I)
(14)
where h¯ is a cap on high hk(·) for weighting purposes. This effectively places more weight
on the more recent h¯ observations. In practice, h¯ begins at 100 and doubles every 1, 000, 000
iterations until it ceases to bind. In all cases, the test concluded that an algorithm had been
reached before at most 350 million iterations and in some cases much sooner.
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